First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Originally published in 1940, this is a contribution to the better understanding of Evangelical experience and doctrine. It is the author’s belief that the application of psychology to religion in general can make little or no further advance except through the study of particular types of religious experience. The various psychotherapeutic techniques provide the means for such a study, and in this volume they are applied to Evangelicalism. At first the author attempts to justify this application to Evangelical experience and (...) doctrine, and outlines what he believes to be the essence of Evangelicalism. Part 2 of the book begins the contribution proper with an attempt to get a clear view of conscience and proceeds to salvation and its problems: conversion, guilt, sin, forgiveness, atonement. Part 3 deals with Evangelical experience and doctrine and the spiritual life of the Evangelical, and concludes with some general applications of psychology to Church work. (shrink)

This study focused on the state-level implementation of the Common Core English Language Arts (CC-ELA) standards and the implications for state education department personnel in social studies. Researchers employed a mixed methods approach to data collection and analysis asking the following research questions: (1) How do state-level social studies coordinators understand the obligations and implications of the CC-ELA standards for social studies? and (2) What benefits and challenges do they anticipate the CC-ELA standards offer to social studies educators? Findings from (...) the survey and interviews offer a glimpse into the thinking of social studies coordinators. The findings clustered around four assertions: (1) Coordinators were generally supportive of the CC-ELA standards, (2) CC-ELA is changing the way social studies is enacted at the state level, (3) Coordinators were cautiously optimistic about the impact of CC-ELA on elementary social studies, and (4) Coordinators were consistently positive about the impact of CC-ELA on secondary social studies. The positive views of the CC-ELA standards, however, appeared to do little to mitigate the challenge that the state coordinators face as they translate the standards and teach them to social studies teachers across their states. (shrink)

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.

The ongoing explosion of interest in artificial intelligence is fueled in part by recently developed techniques in machine learning. Those techniques allow automated systems to process huge amounts of data, utilizing mathematical methods that depart from traditional statistical approaches, and resulting in impressive advancements in our ability to make predictions and uncover correlations across a host of interesting domains. But as is now widely discussed, the way that those systems arrive at their outputs is often opaque, even to the experts (...) who design and deploy them. Is it morally problematic to make use of opaque automated methods when making high-stakes decisions, like whether to issue a loan to an applicant, or whether to approve a parole request? Many scholars answer in the affirmative. However, there is no widely accepted explanation for why transparent systems are morally preferable to opaque systems. We argue that the use of automated decision-making systems sometimes violates duties of consideration that are owed by decision-makers to decision-subjects, duties that are both epistemic and practical in character. Violations of that kind generate a weighty consideration against the use of opaque decision systems. In the course of defending our approach, we show that it is able to address three major challenges sometimes leveled against attempts to defend the moral import of transparency in automated decision-making. (shrink)

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.

For a variety of reasons, including the common use of deception in psychology experiments, participants often disbelieve experimenters' assertions about important task parameters. This can lead researchers to conclude incorrectly that participants are behaving non- normatively. The problem can be overcome by deriving and testing normative models that do not assume full belief in key task parameters. A real experimental example is discussed.

The first mention of the concept of an inconsistency measure for sets of formulas in first-order logic was given in 1978, but that paper presented only classifications for them. The first actual inconsistency measure with a numerical value was given in 2002 for sets of formulas in propositional logic. Since that time, researchers in logic and AI have developed a substantial theory of inconsistency measures. While this is an interesting topic from the point of view of logic, an important motivation (...) for this work is also that some intelligent systems may encounter inconsistencies in their operation. This research deals primarily with propositional knowledge bases, that is, finite sets of propositional logic formulas. The goal of this paper is to extend the concept of inconsistency measure in a formal way to sets of formulas with the modal operators “necessarily” and “possibly” applied to propositional logic formulas. We use frames for the semantics, but in a way that is different from the way that frames are commonly used in modal logics, in order to facilitate measuring inconsistency. As a set of formulas may have different inconsistency measures for different frames, we define the concept of a standard frame that can be used for all finite sets of formulas in the language. We do this for two languages. The first language, AMPL, contains formulas where a prefix of operators is applied to a propositional logic formula. The second language, CMPL, adds connectives that can be applied to AMPL formulas in a limited way. We show how to extend propositional logic inconsistency measures to such sets of formulas. Finally, we define a new concept, weak inconsistency measure, and show how to compute it. (shrink)

Branching time logics have been studied in computer science since the 1980s primarily to model the tree of computations for discrete transition systems. Inconsistency measures for propositional log...

Over the past decade there has been a remarkable expansion in the use of ‘imaginaries’ as a guiding concept in and beyond political theory. But the proliferation of this term has gone largely unchecked by critical investigations into its deployment. To correct this I address the work of Charles Taylor, Michael Warner and Chiara Bottici, each of whom has written influential texts on imaginaries and the sites of imaginaries. Interestingly, their reliance on imaginaries does not compel them to do away (...) with older modes of thinking such as ideology critique and dialectical thought. Yet what remains of these enduring modes has been sanitized, their radical commitments scarcely pursued. I proceed by conducting an immanent critique of each author’s work, revealing troublesome pre-critical and instrumentalist features that lead to political phenomena being misrepresented or going unidentified entirely. In addition I elaborate modes of dialectical thought and ideology critique that avoid these difficulties and produce the types of critical insights absent from these texts. (shrink)

The concept of measuring inconsistency in information was developed by John Grant in a 1978 paper in the context of first-order logic. For more than 20 years very little was done in this area until in the early 2000s a number of AI researchers started to formulate new inconsistency measures primarily in the context of propositional logic knowledge bases. The aim of this volume is to survey what has been done so far, to expand inconsistency measurement to other (...) formalisms, to connect it with related topics, and to provide ideas for further research in a topic that is particularly relevant now in view of the many inconsistencies in the massive amount of information available. The book contains 11 chapters. The first chapter, by John Grant, gives his original motivation for starting this field, explains why it was formulated in a highly mathematical manner, presents important material that was omitted from the original paper, and provides ideas about the use of dimensions in measuring inconsistency. The second chapter, by Matthias Thimm, is a survey that covers most of the research on inconsistency measures up to 2017. The other 9 chapters, all by experts either in inconsistency measures, or in the topic under consideration, or both, connect inconsistency measures with argumentation, disjunctive logic programming, fuzzy logic systems, modal logics, multiset representation, paraconsistent consequence, probabilistic logic, relational databases, and spatio-temporal databases."-- back cover. (shrink)

Consistency is one of the key concepts of logic; logicians have put a great deal of effort into proving the consistency of many logics. Understanding what causes inconsistency is also important; some logicians have developed paraconsistent logics that, unlike classical logics, allow some contradictions without making all formulas provable. Another direction of research studies inconsistency by measuring the amount of inconsistency of sets of formulas. While the initial attempt in 1978 was too ambitious in trying to do this for first-order (...) logic, this research got a substantial boost when an inconsistency measure was proposed for propositional logic in 2002. Since then, researchers in logic and artificial intelligence have made many interesting proposals and found related issues. Almost all of this work has been done for propositional logic. The purpose of this paper is to extend inconsistency measures to logics that also contain operators, such as modal operators. We use the terminology “generalized propositional logic” for such logics. We show how to extend propositional inconsistency measures to sets of formulas in any such generalized propositional logic. Examples are used to illustrate how various modal operators, including spatial and tense operators, fit into this framework. We also show that the addition of operators leads to a weak type of inconsistency. In all cases, the calculations for several inconsistency measures are given. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence, in press. Abstract: For some time we have been developing, and have had significant practical success with, a time-sensitive, contradiction-tolerant logical reasoning engine called the active logic machine (ALMA). The current paper details a semantics for a general version of the underlying logical formalism, active logic. Central to active logic are special rules controlling the inheritance of beliefs in general (and of beliefs about the current time in particular), very tight controls on what can be derived from direct (...) contradictions (P &￢P), and mechanisms allowing an agent to represent and reason about its own beliefs and past reasoning. Furthermore, inspired by the notion that until an agent notices that a set of beliefs is contradictory, that set seems consistent (and the agent therefore reasons with it as if it were consistent), we introduce an “apperception function” that represents an agent’s limited awareness of its own beliefs, and serves to modify inconsistent belief sets so as to yield consistent sets. Using these ideas, we introduce a new definition of logical consequence in the context of active logic, as well as a new definition of soundness such that, when reasoning with consistent premises, all classically sound rules remain sound in our new sense. However, not everything that is classically sound remains sound in our sense, for by classical definitions, all rules with contradictory premises are vacuously sound, whereas in active logic not everything follows from a contradiction. (shrink)

The current paper details a restricted semantics for active logic, a time-sensitive, contradictiontolerant logical reasoning formalism. Central to active logic are special rules controlling the inheritance of beliefs in general, and beliefs about the current time in particular, very tight controls on what can be derived from direct contradictions (P &¬P ), and mechanisms allowing an agent to represent and reason about its own beliefs and past reasoning. Using these ideas, we introduce a new definition of model and of logical (...) consequence, as well as a new definition of soundness such that, when reasoning with consistent premises, all classically sound rules are sound for active logic. However, not everything that is classically sound remains sound in our sense, for by classical definitions, all rules with contradictory premises are vacuously sound, whereas in active logic not everything follows from a contradiction. (shrink)

Grant and Quiggin suggest that agents employ heuristics to constrain the set of acts under consideration before applying standard decision theory, based on their restricted model of the world to the remaining acts. The aim of this paper is to provide an axiomatic foundation, and an associated representation theorem, for the preference model proposed by Grant and Quiggin. The unawareness of the agent is encoded both in the specification of the states and in an elaboration of the set (...) of consequences. We illustrate how the representation can be applied to rationalize two notions of the precautionary principle that were proposed and discussed in Grant and Quiggin. (shrink)

1. Although the idea of measuring inconsistency was proposed in Grant (1978), the subject gained interest in 2002 with the publication of a proposal for measuring inconsistency in propositional kno...

This book considers questions such as these and argues for a conception of consciousness, mental content and intentionality that is anti-Cartesian in its major...

The mechanisms responsible for the fine tuning of development, where the wildtype phenotype is reproduced with high fidelity, are not well understood. The difficulty in approaching this problem is the identification of mutant phenotypes indicative of a defect in these fine‐tuning control mechanisms. Evolutionary biologists have used asymmetry as a measure of developmental homeostasis. The rationale for this was that, since the same genome controls the development of the left and right sides of a bilaterally symmetrical organism, departures from symmetry (...) can be used to measure genetic or environmental perturbations. This paper examines the relationship between asymmtry and resistance to organophosphorous insecticides in the Australian sheep blowfly, Lucilia cuprina. A resistance gene, Rop‐1, which encodes a carboxylesterase enzyme, also confers a significant increase in asymmetry. Continued exposure of resistant populations to insecticide has selected a dominant suppressor of the asymmetry phenotype. Genetic evidence indicates that the modifier is the L. cuprina Notch homologue. (shrink)

The study of paraconsistent logic as a branch of mathematics and logic has been pioneered by Newton da Costa. With the growing advent of distributed and often inconsistent databases over the last ten years, there has been growing interest in paraconsistency amongst researchers in databases and knowledge bases. In this paper, we provide a brief survey of work in paraconsistent databases and knowledge bases affected by Newton da Costa's important and lasting contributions to the field.

We address the issue of manipulating games through communication. In the specific setting we consider (a variation of Boolean games), we assume there is some set of environment variables, the values of which are not directly accessible to players; the players have their own beliefs about these variables, and make decisions about what actions to perform based on these beliefs. The communication we consider takes the form of (truthful) announcements about the values of some environment variables; the effect of an (...) announcement is the modification of the beliefs of the players who hear the announcement so that they accurately reflect the values of the announced variables. By choosing announcements appropriately, it is possible to perturb the game away from certain outcomes and towards others. We specifically focus on the issue of stabilisation: making announcements that transform a game from having no stable states to one that has stable configurations. (shrink)